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Farmers and agribusiness firms are often in the position of 
employer supervising anywhere from one to several employees. 
Workers' compensation is but one of the many concerns these 
employers must face. Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court and 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio have handed down rulings jeopardizing the security 
workers' compensation was designed to provide.! 
BACKGROUND 
The purpose of Ohio's workers' compensation law has always 
been to ensure that compensation for injuries sustained in the 
course of employment be regarded as a charge upon the business 
and that payment be made through a speedy and inexpensive process 
as a substitute for previously unsatisfactory methods.2 As a 
result, workers' compensation has come to be regarded by employ-
ers as a cost of doing business and as an employee insurance 
program for work-related injuries. 
lJones v. V.I.P. Development, 15 Ohio St.3d 90 (1984) 
Davis v. Rockwell International, 596 F.Supp 780 <N.D.,Ohio,l984) 
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The "old" workers/ compensation law was regarded by the 
courts as a substitute for the common law cause of action against 
an employer for injuries sustained by an employee in the course 
of employment. Workers' compensation was never designed to 
shield an employer from liability for intentionally harmful acts, 
but was designed to provide a pool from which recovery could be 
collected without the time delay, legal dificulties, and finan-
cial burdens inherent in the traditional common law remedies.3 
Prior to the enactment of workers' compensation, employees 
had to sue the employer to obtain compensation for work-related 
injuries unless the employer paid voluntarily. Before the recent 
court decisions, an employer could only be held liable for 
monetary damages in addition to workers' compensation benefits if 
the employee could prove a specific intent on the part of the 
employer to harm a particular employee in a particular manner.4 
This was a dificult standard to meet and, in effect, shielded the 
employer from damage claims in addition to workers compensation 
except under the most serious circumstances. When the standard 
was met, however, the employer could be forced to respond in 
damage payments for these intentional acts. 
The employer benefitted from this program because it 
provided stability and predictability to the settlement of 
work-related injuries. The employer would either pay a premium 
to a state fund from which benefits were awarded or could be 
3Art. II; Sec. 35 Ohio Constitution 
Roof v. Velsicol, 380 F.Supp 1373 <N.D.,Ohio, 1974) 
4Jones v. V.I.P. Development, 15 Ohio St.3d 90, 95 (1984) 
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self-insured and pay only the amount specified upon each claim by 
the workers' compensation board of review. In return, the 
employer was protected from unlimited liability for work-related 
injuries. 
The employee also benefitted from the workers' compensation 
law. The employee only needed to make an application to the 
workers' compensation board of review on a valid claim to receive 
adequate compensation. This eliminated the need to go through 
the dificulties of a lawsuit to obtain the needed funds. In 
addition, the employee could sue the employer at common law for 
injuries sustained as a result of the employer's intentionally 
harmful act if able to prove the requisite specific intent. This 
"quid pro quo" provided the basis upon which workers' compensa-
tion flourished for some seventy years prior to 1982.5 
Generally, the workers' compensation law in Ohio provides 
that workers' compensation awards "shall be in lieu of all other 
rights to compensation or damages", and an employer who pays the 
specified amounts shall not be liable to respond in damages at 
common law.6 This is what is known as the exclusivity rule 
of workers' compensation. 
Recently, a liberalized view of this exclusivity rule has 
developed in Ohio that threatens to upset the balance of the 
workers' compensation system and to undermine the protection 
SQuid pro quo: Used in law for the g1v1ng of one valuable thing 
for another; mutual consideration. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1123 (5th ed. 1979). 
6Art. II; Sec. 35 Ohio Constitution 
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initially provided by the legislature. While the employee is 
still provided with the speedy and inexpensive remedy of workers' 
compensation, the employer is no longer provided the protection 
from unlimited liability nor the stability and predictability of 
the old system. 
RECENT D.E.VELOPMENTS 
Two recent cases on this issue have redefined the standard 
of intent and have led to the relaxation of the exclusivity 
rule.7 
Jones was a consolidation of three similar lawsuits. In the 
first action, a city power plant employee died of injuries 
sustained in the course of his employment. The discharge chute 
he was responsible for keeping clear of dust accumulation 
initially had a safety cover on it that was removed by the 
defendant/employer. In an effort to remove coal accumulation, 
his hand became caught in the chute. He subsequently died of 
the injury. 
After a jury verdict for the plaintiff/employee for 
$125,000, an appeals court reversed judgment stating the 
plaintiff had failed to show that the employer's acts were 
intentional. The court further ruled that the receipt of 
workers' compensation benefits precluded the recovery of common 
law damages.B 
7Jones v. V.I.P. Development, 15 Ohio St.3d 90 (1984). 
Davis v. Rockwell International, 596 F.Supp 780 (N.D.,Ohio,l984) 
BGains v. City of Painesville, Case No. 84-339 
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In the second of the three consolidated actions, the 
plaintiffs were injured when the boom of the hydraulic excavator 
they were operating came into contact with a high voltage 
electric power line. Both were seriously injured, applied for, 
and received, workers' compensation benefits. The case was 
dismissed when the court determined there was no issue in 
controversy for a jury to decide.9 
In the third action, the plaintiff's alleged that they were 
exposed to toxic chemical fumes and that they sustained serious 
injuries as a result. They also complained that their employer 
knew of the exposure and its harmful nature, but repeatedly 
assured them that the exposure was not dangerous. 
The jury awarded the plaintiffs $43,000 compensatory and 
$5000 punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed stating 
the plaintiffs had failed to show that the employer knowingly 
subjected them to recognized hazards for the purpose of injuring 
them. The court felt the evidence showed only negligence on the 
part of the employer and that, absent the required element of 
specific intent, the injury was exclusively compensible by the 
worker's compensation system.lO 
The three cases were consolidated for the Ohio Supreme Court 
to determine two issues. The first concerned the definition of 
the term "intentional tort." Because the plaintiff's were all 
suing their employer for damages in addition to worker's compens-
9Jones v. V.I.P. Development, Case No. 84-139 
lOHamlin v. Snow Metal Products, Case No. 84-409 
5 
ation benefits, success or failure in proving the requisite 
intent was crucial. A prior Supreme Court holding already had 
established that the receipt of workers' compensation benefits 
does not preclude an employee from pursuing common law remedies 
against an employee for intentional torts.ll 
In Jones, the Court broadened the concept of intentional 
tort to include not only those consequences that are specifically 
intended, but also those consequences the employer believes are 
substantially certain to follow from his acts. Therefore, after 
Jones, an employee no longer must meet the strict standard of a 
specific intent to pursue a common law action against the 
employer. This "implied intent" is now sufficient for the 
employee to recover from the employer.l2 
The plaintiff must show only that the defendant knew or 
reasonably believed that harm was a substantially certain 
consequence of his acts. If the plaintiff succeeds in this 
showing, the court will infer an intent on the part of the 
employer to injure the employee. The test of this implied intent 
is whether the employer knew, or reasonably should have known, of 
the creation of a substantial risk of injury. 
In the first of the three consolidated actions, the Court 
ruled that an employer who fails to warn of a known defect which 
poses a serious threat of injury may be considered to have acted 
despite a belief that harm is substantially certain to occur. 
llBlankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, 69 Ohio St.2d 608 
(1982) 
12Jones at 1051 
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Thus, inaction in regards to a known danger can be viewed in the 
same light as actions taken that result in injury.l3 
In the second action, the Court ruled that the complaint 
contained sufficient allegations of intentional misconduct under 
the new standard to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the 
average juror so as not to be·dismissed on a motion for summary 
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the judge 
determines there is no issue in controversy requiring jury 
consideration <reasonable minds could not differ on the matter). 
The allegations in the complaint stated that the 
employer "knew, or should have known," that the employee would be 
subjected to substantial risks yet failed to take action to make 
the area safe. The complaint also alleged that the employer 
failed to warn of the danger once knowledge of the risk was 
acquired. These allegation were sufficient in the eyes of the 
Supreme Court to create an issue upon which reasonable minds 
could differ. 
Therefore, in order to proceed with a common law action, an 
employee need only allege that the employer knew of the risk and 
allege that the employer took no action to prevent the resulting 
injury. This imposes a substantial burden on the employer even 
in the absence of a valid claim as he is nevertheless obligated 
to develop a legal defense. This can represent a major expense 
in and of itself, one which would not have arisen under the 
pre-Jones workers' compensation system. 
13Jones, at 1052 
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ELECTION OF REMEDIES 
In Davis v. Rockwell International, the Federal District 
Court analyzed a similar circumstance in precisely the same 
manner as the Ohio Supreme Court. The court interpreted existing 
Ohio law as not requiring an employee to prove a specific intent 
to injure, but that a failure to warn of a known danger may 
amount to intentionally tortious conduct. The presence of this 
intent is a question for the jury and dismissal prior to their 
consideration is inappropriate. 
The court noted that one of the purposes of the Act, 
providing for a safe and healthy work environment, would not be 
fulfilled if an employee could commit intentional torts having 
only to worry about increases in workers' compensation premiums. 
The federal court also resolved the second issue, whether 
receipt of workers' compensation benefits precludes an employee 
from pursuing a common law action against the employer, in 
precisely the same manner as the Supreme Court in Jones and 
Blankenship. The doctrine of election of remedies has as its 
purpose preventing multiple recoveries and preventing a party 
from pursuing in one action what was rejected in a prior 
action.l4 The court noted that this doctrine was a harsh rule 
and not favored in Ohio. 
The prerequisites to the application of the doctrine include 
the existence of two or more remedies, inconsistency between the 
14United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968,971 (5th Cir.,l983) 
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two, and a choice of one in a prior action.l5 In Jones, the 
Court noted that workers' compensation benefits are designed to 
protect against negligent and reckless conduct, and common law 
recoveries are designed to compensate for intentionally tortious 
acts. Therefore, the two are not inconsistent and the receipt of 
workers' compensation benefits does not constitute an election of 
remedies. 
The Supreme Court stated that viewing the receipt of 
benefits as a forfeiture of the employee's common law rights of 
action would not only be harsh and unjust, but that it would 
frustrate the purpose of the Act and run contrary to previous 
Supreme Court rulings. In addition, such a rule would allow the 
employer to escape meaningful responsibility for safety abuses. 
The Court in a prior decision held that protection under the 
workers' compensation system was always for negligent and 
reckless acts and not for intentionally harmful conduct.l6 
Finally, the Supreme Court in Jones ruled that the employer 
is not entitled to a set-off in the amount of the workers' 
compensation benefits awarded to the employee due to the employ-
er's intentionally tortious conduct. Due to the absence of 
identity between the two recoveries, the Court held them to be 
separate awards for separate claims with no direct relationship. 
The Ag community is not immune from such lawsuits. As of 
this date, there are at least two lawsuits pending in Ohio 
1525 Am.Jur.2d, Election of Remedies, Sees. 8,22,and 23 
16Blankenship, 69 Ohio St.2d 608 
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in which an employee is suing a farmer 
compensated for by workers' compensation. 
the application of this new "intentional 
for injuries previously 
Both lawsuits involve 
tort" theory and both 
plaintiffs are asking for damages in excess of $2 million. 
One of these lawsuits sounds very much like the facts in 
Gains v. City of Painesville, one of the three consolidated cases 
decided in Jones. The farmer had removed the safety shield from 
the power takeoff on his tractor because the hay bailer would not 
function properly with it in place. The employee had been warned 
of the modification and the danger inherent in the system on 
several occasions, including the day of the accident. 
Contrary to the warnings, the employee dismounted from the 
tractor with the power takeoff engaged, his pant leg became 
entangled in it, and his leg was severed just below the knee. At 
the time of the accident he was receiving $100 per week for odd 
jobs around the farm; he is now receiving over five times that 
amount in workers' compensation benefits. In addition to this 
permanent, partial disability award, the employee is seeking $2 
million from the man he claimed had helped him more than anyone 
else in his life. 
INSURANCE AS A PROTECTIVE MEASURE 
Employers are now faced with the question of how they are to 
protect themselves and how to obtain insurance against this type 
of recovery. Business liability insurance coverage does not 
provide for intentional tort judgments. Once a court determines 
that an employer is liable for an injury resulting from intent-
10 
ionally tortious conduct, the standard business liability policy 
ceases to be of assistance in providing financial protection. 
Virtually all business liability policies provide a legal 
defense against employee lawsuits regardless of the theory 
underlying the suit. However, in the example illustrated 
abioive, the farmer has been forced to bring suit against each of 
his two insurance companies in an attempt to force them to 
provide a legal defense. Employers should review their policy or 
consult their agent to determine if they are provided such 
a defense. 
At least one insurance company offers a policy in addition 
to the traditional business liability insurance that they claim 
will cover a judgment based on this new theory of intentional 
tort. This "stop gap" policy is priced at a percentage of the 
employer's workers' compensation premium and it's cost is 
somewhat prohibitive. 
This type of policy is offered with the express written 
reservation that the court may not allow coverage under certain 
circumstances. One insurance company is quick to point out that 
some courts in Ohio have stated indirectly that allowing an 
insurance company to pay an intentional tort judgment against an 
employer would be contrary to public policy. These awards have 
been viewed as punitive in nature and allowing an insurance 
company to pay the judgment would eliminate the effect of this 
"slap on the wrist." 
Employers should contact their insurance agents and deter-
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mine if they are covered in the event of such an accident and if 
the policy will provide the insured a legal defense to a subse-
quent lawsuit. If a positive representation is obtained, the 
discussion should be summarized in a letter to the agent sent by 
the employer seeking an affirmation of the representation. 
Should the situation arise, these correspondences can be used as 
evidence that the company represented to the employer that 
coverage would be provided and might convince the court to 
mandate such coverage. 
SELF HELP PROTECTION 
Self help and increased awareness appear to be the most 
effective means by which an employer can prevent economic 
disaster from "intentional" tort liability while at the same time 
improving the working conditions of the employee. 
First, an employer should inspect all equipment to be 
assured that all safety devices are in place and functioning 
properly. If not, special steps must be taken to repair or 
replace the item or find some sort of substitute safety appar-
atus. Warning labels and instructional writings must be in 
place, clean, and legible. If not, replacements must be sought 
or the reason for their illegibility eliminated. 
Second, all employees must be trained in the operation of 
all equipment from the simplest to the most complex. Though 
seemingly unnecessary, this training should be conducted thoro-
ughly and documented, including the signatures of all trained 
12 
employees. This documented training should include instruction 
not only as to any special modifications or circumstances, but 
also as to the simplest routine use of the machinery. These 
suggestions, taken together, create evidence that can be crucial 
at trial in convincing the jury that he actively attempted to 
warn the employees and to prevent any foreseeable accidents. 
In addition, employers should not hesitate to discipline an 
employee for improper use of the equipment. This discipline 
should be documented, signed and progressive. If a certain 
point is reached where the employer can be discipline no further, 
then the employee should be suspended or released. Otherwise, a 
court may find the employers' acts were insufficient in the face 
of known dangers. 
It may be advisable to do as a farmer in Northwest Ohio has 
done and conduct a "tour" of the operation to identify all 
potentially hazardous areas. This inspection should be conducted 
with all employees and their suggestions and comments should be 
solicited, noted, and followed up. These measures may sound 
childish, but the door to umlimited liability is wide open and 
the employer must utilize every means by which to protect against 
such a ruinous lawsuit under the new theory. 
PENDING LEGISLATION 
There has been legislation introduced in the General 
Assembly addressing this issue. Senate Bill 155 was specifically 
designed to reverse the theory developed by the Ohio Supreme 
Court in Jones. The intent required under this proposed legisla-
13 
tion was phrased in terms of a "specific, deliberate intent to 
cause the resulting injury... Specific, deliberate intent means 
that the employer acted with a consciously, subjectively, and 
deliberately formed intention and purpose to cause the specific 
resulting injury or death. 
The wording was quite 
opponents of the bill were 
strict 
quite 
and both 
forceful 
proponents and 
in making their 
positions known during the Senate hearings. Employer groups are 
concerned about the potential exodus of corporations from Ohio 
due to their fear of financial disaster as a result of this 
liberalized exclusivity rule. Farm organizations are keenly 
interested in the passage of the bill because of the impact of 
Jones upon the high risk agriculture industry. 
Two bills had been introduced in the Ohio House of Repre-
sentives regarding the workers' compensation system (H.B. 423 and 
H.B. 424). House Bill 423 limits the receipt of workers' 
compensation benefits to injuries 
premises or while in a vehicle 
sustained on the employer's 
under the control of the 
employer. More on point is House Bill 424, designed to bar 
employees who receive workers' compensation benefits from suing 
their employer and barring employees from receiving workers' 
compensation benefits if they elect to sue their employer at 
common law. 
All three of these bills were tabled indefinitely in lieu of 
the findings of a specially empaneled "Blue Ribbon" Commission on 
workers' compensation. The Commission, established by the 
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General Asembly was supposed to conduct hearings on the status of 
workers' compensation in Ohio and make recommendations by 
November, 1, 1985 for implementation on January 1, 1986. 
After several heated sessions, the Commission found the two 
sides of the issue to be at loggerheads and dismissed the parties 
to draw up proposals for submission. The Commission then 
intended to magically mesh the two proposals into one recommenda-
tion to solve the problems faced by workers' compensation. 
However, after the proposals were submitted, the Commission 
concluded their task was impossible and adjourned themselves 
forever. 
A bill has now been introduced in the House of Representa-
tives (H.B. 73) and one is being drafted for submission in the 
Senate (authored by Sen. Richard Finan) designed to resolve the 
problem of workers' compensation. As stated, the courts, 
including the Supreme Court of Ohio have sustained the holdingh 
in Jones v. V.I.P. Development and show no inclination of 
modifying the new theory whatsoever. Action in the General 
Assembly is the only viable option available for reaching a 
solution on the issue and all attention and input should be 
focused accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
The agricultural employer subject to the workers' compensa-
tion must be aware of these recent developments in the law of 
workers' compensation. The relaxed exclusivity rule make it much 
easier for an employee to recover both from the workers' compens-
15 
ation system and directly from the employer. In addition, the 
new definition of "intentional tort" jeopardizes the protection 
once provided by the system. 
Additional protective measures must be taken to protect 
against injuries that may be viewed as resulting from the 
"intentional" acts of the employer. If the court views acts 
as intentional, neither workers' compensation nor other tradi-
tional business liability insurance will protect the employer 
from potentially disastrous judgments. 
Though these results seem inequitable, the Supreme Court has 
upheld this new rule in similar lawsuits since Jones involving 
similar circumstances.l7 Legislation is pending to correct 
these changes in the law, but employers should take steps to 
protect themselves now. 
17Bradfield v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 17 Ohio St.3d 58 (1985, revid 
on authority of Jones) 
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